Senator Lauren Book quietly changed law on cyberstalking in her continued effort to silence critic

It seems that FloriDUH State Senator Lauren Book, still butthurt at Derek Logue's victory over her in the courts, has abused the legislature to pass a bill allowing her to silence her critics yet again. 

CS/HB 921, signed into law on 7/6/2021 (as Chapter No. 2021-220), contains a rather vague provision to the state's cyberstalking law:

https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2021/921/Amendment/725860/PDF

(d) “Cyberstalk” means:

1. To engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person;

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The underlined and emboldened words are the additions, and they emphasize the fact that Lauren Book's intent with the changes is to criminalize criticism. 

As noted in Logue v Book 297 So. 3d 605 (Fla. Ct. App. 2020):

"Respondent’s website is essentially a blog that primarily republishes news articles about Petitioner and her father, detailing what Respondent describes as “their questionable activity.” As a result, most of the website’s content is culled from various third-party sources and contains information published in other media. It is undisputed that Respondent never directly communicated with Petitioner about any of the posts, nor did he ever send them to her or any of her associates. According to one witness who testified at the injunction hearing, Petitioner and her group only learned of the posts from third-parties, and became concerned because “it seemed to be the language was maybe more inflammatory and very opinion based, using language that was . . . kind of angry or derogative, insulting, personally insulting in addition to being just kind of a disagreement of opinions and ideas.” Even in the light most favorable to Petitioner’s view of the content and assuming that description to be accurate, none of the posts are sufficient to support an injunction, because none of them constitute either a threat or harassment under the cyberstalking statute..."

"Finally, the Third District emphasized that, regardless of the forum, actions designed to harangue or threaten violence are not protected: Angry social media postings are now common.

Jilted lovers, jilted tenants, and attention-seeking bloggers spew their anger into fiber-optic cables and cyberspace. But analytically, and legally, these rants are essentially the electronic successors of the pre-blog, solo complainant holding a poster on a public sidewalk in front of an auto dealer that proclaimed, “DON’T BUY HERE! ONLY LEMONS FROM THESE CROOKS!” Existing and prospective customers of the auto dealership considering such a poster made up their minds based on their own experience and research. If and when a hypothetical complainant with the poster walked into the showroom and harangued individual customers, or threatened violence, however, the previously-protected opinion crossed the border into the land of trespass, business interference, and amenability to tailored injunctive relief. The same well developed body of law allows the complaining blogger to complain, with liability for money damages for defamation if the complaints are untruthful and satisfy the elements of that cause of action. Injunctive relief to prohibit such complaints is another matter altogether. Id. at 1092..."

"Considering the various events alleged, we cannot say they were so devoid of a legitimate purpose as to make them actionable under the statute. Each party in this case is a vocal advocate for opposite positions on sex offender laws. Despite Petitioner’s complaints, Respondent’s Tallahassee protest was by all accounts peaceful—even if unpleasant to Petitioner in its scope and message—and non-violent. See § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016) (stating that “constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organize protests” are specifically exempted from being included in the definition of “course of conduct.”). The parties’ opposing viewpoints on such laws are widely debated within what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once described as the “free trade in ideas.” Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). True, one side of this debate has far greater public support than the other, but that does not make the Respondent’s advocacy illegitimate."

"Respondent did not drive by Petitioner’s home, take a picture of her private residence, and then disseminate that information. Petitioner’s home address as an elected official is a matter of public record for the purposes of validating her residency. Additionally, Petitioner chose to use her home for business and politics. While she is certainly free to do so, she cannot then obtain an injunction against someone who elects to further publicize that widely available information. Respondent did not unjustifiably expose her private residence address to the public as Petitioner contends; he merely republished the corporate address of Petitioner’s PAC along with other information about it culled from public disclosures. See Palm Beach Newspapers, LLC, 183 So. 3d at 483 (“Where matters of public concern are involved, privacy interests give way to the First Amendment right to publish lawfully obtained, truthful information about such matters.”). Unless Petitioner’s home address was otherwise private or confidential, and it was not, her actions conducting her public advocacy from the residence placed it well into the public domain. When Petitioner chose to have her non-confidential home address double as her business address, thereby voluntarily combining certain aspects of her private life with her public one, she lost the ability to claim a concurrent privacy interest in the areas that overlapped. Therefore, Respondent had the constitutional right to republish that unprotected information."

"Petitioner alleged that she was in fear of Respondent due to his actions, but her subjective fear cannot be the basis for the injunction’s issue. “[C]ourts apply a reasonable person standard, not a subjective standard, to determine whether an incident causes substantial emotional distress.” Schack, 192 So. 3d at 628 (quoting Touhey v. Seda, 133 So. 3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)). However, we need not make any determination about whether Petitioner’s fear was objectively reasonable because the Tallahassee protest, Respondent’s attendance at the film festival, and the social media posts did not satisfy the statute’s requirements to support the injunction."

" Though her frustration is understandable, expressions of opposing views, even as insults, are not the same as harassment or threats.

This exchange from the injunction hearing, a colloquy between counsel for Respondent and a law enforcement officer witness, sums up the case well:

[Respondent’s counsel]: What intentions and threats can you articulate that were made by Derek Logue against Lauren Book?

[Officer]: Not one specific, sir.

[Respondent’s counsel]: Okay. How about any?

[Officer]: The use of the song to communicate his feelings and thoughts.

[Respondent’s counsel]. Other than the song.

[Officer]: His anger that he has expressed, which I understand is okay to do.

Simply put, the officer was correct. Publicly expressing anger toward an elected official is not a basis for entry of an injunction. In public debate, elected officials must tolerate insulting remarks—even angry, outrageous speech—to provide breathing room for the First Amendment. See Fox v. Hamptons at Metrowest Condo. Ass’n, 223 So. 3d 453, 456 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). Respondent’s methods and posts, as boorish, crude, and crass as they may be, must also be considered “against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public  issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression unprotected.”). Respondent’s actions and comments, while distasteful, are precisely the kind of “vehement, caustic, and . . . unpleasantly sharp” political speech which has historically been protected by the First Amendment and which fall outside the Florida harassment statutes. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270."

"Additionally, Petitioner’s subjective response to Respondent’s speech does not change the fact that, even though both she and law enforcement considered him “threatening,” he neither made a credible threat against her nor did his actions constitute harassment. Viewing someone as a  “threat” does not mean the person can be subject to an injunction as if he or she actually made one. Whether Petitioner has understandable concerns is not the debate. The standard for obtaining an injunction is not lessened in cases involving delicate complainants, nor is every statement or action that causes a listener fear, discomfort, embarrassment, annoyance or offense transformed as a result into a “threat” providing the basis for an injunction. See Horowitz, 160 So. 3d at 533"

"Clearly, Respondent seeks to bring about political and social policy change. It is immaterial whether he enjoys significant public support for his positions. While his methods may be bombastic and extreme— particularly his many unfortunate and insulting references to Petitioner and her father—this type of political hyperbole does not take the communication out of the protections of the First Amendment."

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Senator Lauren F. Book (The "F" should stand for Fraud) and her thrice convicted father Ronald "Stagger-Lee" Book have spent the last 15 years putting people under bridges and along railroad tracks while raking in millions of dollars. If they believe no one listens to Derek Logue, why do they fear him so much? Just read the rest of this blog to see why. Derek Logue didn't write the articles posted by South Florida media, he simply compiled it. Everything here other than the opinions of Mr. Logue and other contributors to this blog are from third-party sources. 

But if Lauren Book has her way, she won't even allow ANY criticism against her whatsoever. That is why the language of the new law is a major First Amendment issue. "Indirect" speech and speech that mearly "pertains to" someone means you don't have to talk directly to that person; you simply have to talk ABOUT that person and person can access it. Senator Rhymes-With-Crook can look at this very blog, see something that "triggers" her, then go press charges. 

She's proven to be a useful idiot for the right-wingers in Florida, who also wanted this law to go after critics. Republican Governor Ron DeSantis is already trying to abuse state law to silence his critics.

One case in particular has parallels the ongoing fight between our main contributor here and Senator Book. As noted in the Gainesville Times, Daniel Uhlfelder, a lawyer who dresses as the grim reaper and goes to the beach as a public protest of Desantis's COVID policies has also created a political action committee called "Remove Ron." And just like this blog, Uhlfelder has said some mean things about his target. It seem's we both may agree that Ron should be deposed, we just have a different idea of which Ron (although I wouldn't see Ron DeSantis deposed as well). 

I have a feeling this law will be struck down, but not until some unfortunate soul spends (up to 15) years behind bars for malicious prosecution, likely by a politician like Senator Book.